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Abstract—Web services are modular, self describing software
components that can be invoked over a distributed network.
A single transaction can be composed of many individual Web
services.
There are many security considerations that have to be taken
into account when assessing such a Web service transaction. This
paper investigates the security concerns involved in composite
Web services and introduces at the relevant security standards
and legislation as motivation for a trust assurance protocol.
In this paper, we focus on the transaction path elicitation in
Web services transactions so that trust may be established in an
environment where near-perfect information can be achieved.
I. INTRODUCTION
Web services are becoming a standard way of interacting
with business partners and service providers in order to provide
business solutions. The advantages of Web services are that
they can connect parties regardless of their operating platforms
and programming implementations. This means that heteroge-
neous applications can interconnect and work together on a
problem without having to spend too much time configuring
the environment to allow parties to communicate effectively.
A Web services transaction involves two or more parties that
take part in processing a task to achieve a particular goal. Web
services can be chained together, each adding its services to
the overall transaction until it is completed.
Chains spanning multiple services are generally invisible to
the original requestor, who has the impression of a simple
request-reply transaction with only one partner. In reality, the
business partner could include other service providers and
generally has to include partners such as merchant banks and
other financial institutions into a business transaction. The
original requestor of the service has no say in how external
services handle its personal information and in most cases, is
not even aware of another service provider’s presence in the
transaction [1].
The threat of online fraud and misuse of personal or person-
ally identifying information (PII) and the interception of Web
services messages by malicious third parties has created a mass
of activity to secure Web services. WS-Security[2] has become
the leading standards upon which security specifications can
be based to become an overall framework in which Web
services messages can be secured. This allows a requestor to
be confident that communication between itself and the service
provider is kept confidential and that the message’s integrity
is ensured.
Even with the current specifications and standards, the
requestor does not have enough control over what a service
provider does with personal information once he has received
it. Policy languages for Web services which defines what either
party may and may not do with the information exist to combat
this eventuality, including WS-Policy[3] and the Web services
Policy Language (WSPL). In a transaction that is made up of
more than one service provider, the client has no knowledge
of how the service provider sends their information to another
service provider, and cannot influence the decision over which
parties the service should interact with. The policy reached
between two service providers might not be acceptable to the
original requestor, but he has no control over the use of his
information in the communication between the two parties.
If the original requestor was concerned with the protection
of his personal privacy, he might prefer not to engage in the
transaction at all if he couldn’t be sure of who has access to
his personal information, and what they intend to do with the
information they do receive [4].
This paper looks at the environment in which Web ser-
vices can be chained together to form composite chains to
successfully complete a Web service transaction. It highlights
the relevant standards and outlines the requirements to create
transactions in a manner that suits both the Web service
requestor and Web service provider such that it falls under
the legislation of online transactions and provides motivation
for a trust assurance protocol that can be used to control a
transaction given these security concerns.
II. BACKGROUND
Web services are poised to become the next generation
middleware for distributed computing. It will replace propri-
etary middleware solutions with a simpler, standards-based
system. It achieves simplicity by sending all data between
two parties as well formed text messages. Web services make
use of the SOAP standard [5] for the purpose of formatting
text messages in a structured, standardised format. SOAP is
a lightweight communication protocol based on the XML
standard. It is beneficial to base Web services on the SOAP
standard as it is a transport independent protocol, meaning
that a SOAP message can be passed on any existing or future
data transport protocol. SOAP enables distributed applications
to communicate, regardless of the implementation details of
either party.
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Fig. 1. Composite Web services chain
The features of the new middleware computing model
means that distributed computing systems are now more
loosely-coupled than ever before. It has become easier to
interconnect computing applications both within a company’s
internal network as well as external to the network. IBM’s
definition of Web services states that “Web services are
self-contained, modular applications that can be described,
published, located, and invoked over a network, generally, the
World Wide Web.” [6] This positions Web services as external
interfaces to applications within a company’s internal network.
Web services can be described, so that a client, or Web Service
consumer, can ascertain whether or not a web service will meet
his requirements. The Web service consumer can then locate
the service at the network address contained in the description
of the Web service and can invoke the service to fulfill his
requirements.
The potential of Web services has allowed new business
opportunities for companies to expose their internal systems to
trusted business partners and also to exploit their own systems
as potential revenue streams by exposing their services to
unknown parties in ad-hoc business transactions. Because Web
services are self contained systems, they can be linked so that
many Web services can partake in a single transaction. For
example, in figure 1, a Web services producer involved in a
transaction with the Web services consumer can invoke the
services of a Web services enabled credit checking company
to see whether the Web services consumer can pay for the
right to use the Web Service. The merchant bank can then in
turn call the client’s bank to confirm payment details or credit
information.
All these aspects of Web services makes it easier to
intercommunicate between organisations and, unfortunately,
introduces a real security concerns in using Web services and
allowing others to use your own systems exposed as Web
services. Web services are still susceptible to conventional
security risks inherent in allowing two parties to communicate
and share confidential data, but also new security risks. For ex-
ample, because Web services messages can travel on existing
transport protocols, the most popular protocol on the internet
being HTTP at the moment, Web services messages effectively
bypass conventional firewalls and intrusion detection systems
because they appear as normal website traffic to both of these
systems. This makes malicious SOAP messages a threat as
they can not easily be detected and dealt with.
Fig. 2. Web services security stack
A lot of activity has taken place in attempts to add com-
prehensive security to SOAP messages. Current transport level
security mechanisms such as SSL aren’t necessarily sufficient
to secure SOAP messages. The reasons for this is listed below:
• SOAP messages may involve multiple parties
• SOAP messages can be sent over any transport protocol
1) Multiple party transactions: SOAP messages can be
secured by transport level security if there are only two parties
involved and they are directly communicating. In such a case,
the Web services provider and the Web service consumer can
set up a SSL connection between themselves and send the
SOAP message through the encrypted pipe. However, SOAP
messages have the capability to be sent to the eventual user
of the Web service via one or more intermediaries. These
intermediaries could, for example, validate the SOAP message,
could add a security token or time-stamp information. If
transport level security is used to secure the message between
the Web service consumer and web service producer, com-
munication with external services would force the companies
to set up another SSL connection between those two parties
and it would be impossible to route and modify the message
between parties without first decrypting the entire payload and
then re-encrypting it at every leg of the transfer.
2) Transport Protocol independence: SOAP was designed
to be independent of transport protocols. If Web services
security incorporated security mechanisms used in transport
level security, it would invalidate the security of Web services
if any other transport protocol is used to transport the Web
service. Web services security independent of any transport
level security is needed to ensure the security of Web services
if new transport protocols supersede existing protocols.
A. Web services security standards
Many specifications and standards have emerged to provide
transport level independent security for Web services. The Web
services security framework has now become mature enough
to consider using it for distributed applications. figure two il-
lustrates the general architecture for Web services security. The
standards are based upon previous standards in the stack and
extend their capabilities to allow new functionality. There are
however, more complicated issues to be resolved before Web
services will become synonymous with electronic commerce
and electronic transactions. Most companies are using Web
services as an interface to existing systems that the companies
use to conduct business in an off-line world. Web services
allow these companies to accept transaction requests from the
internet. The companies however, treat the transaction request
in the same manner in which they process off-line transaction
requests. It is here where problems occur between the two
paradigms. There are a lot more regulations and legislation
concerned with the transfer of electronic information. The
regulations try to ensure that the rights of consumers and
service providers are respected in any transaction. Off-line
transactions represent transactions that are recognised by law
and that can be use a countries legal system to resolve disputes
if they arise. Personal information regulations describing the
collection, storage and dissemination of personally identifiable
information (PII) differ between conventional business trans-
actions and electronic transactions. This will be discussed in
more detail in the following section.
In the online world, regulations and legislation is still
in its infancy, and the problems that lawmakers face are
multiplied when transactions span multiple countries, many
who do not even have legislation for the protection of online
transactions. As an Example, the United States of America
has no federal legislation providing for data privacy in elec-
tronic communications. Instead, America has several Acts for
particular sectors, such as the Financial Modernization Act of
1999, also known as the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act[7], which
includes provisions to protect consumers’ personal financial
information held by financial institutions. Similarly, the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, known
as the HIPAA act, provides requirements for the storage of
pesonal information so that the information cannot be shared
between institutions without the patient’s consent. These sector
specific legislative safeguards provide guidance about what
is required for general personal privacy protection and self
regulatory bodies exist to provide these measures.
Compared to the European union where privacy protec-
tion is a legislative concern, electronic transactions between
companies that reside in America and the European Union is
non-trivial. In fact, the European unions legislation prohibits
electronic transactions with member states and countries who
do not have acceptable privacy protection laws to protect the
members of the European Union. The European Union had
to make an exception to allow electronic transactions with
America because America is a major trade partner with the
European Union.
Agreements between Web services are can be very com-
plicated, and negotiation is required so that all the parties in-
volved in the transaction are satisfied with the conditions under
which the Web service will run. Web services specifications
B. Data Privacy Laws
Data privacy has become a paramount concern in elec-
tronic transactions. Studies of websites have shown that the
number of websites displaying privacy policy information has
increased from 14% in 1998 to over 88% in 200 [8]. This
has mostly been a self-regulatory step as commercial websites
has addressed the concerns of customers who make use of
commercial websites.
The need for legal acknowledgement of electronic trans-
actions has spurred a lot of activity in legislative sectors to
recognise electronic data as legal equivalents of paper based
transactions. The United Nations Commission of International
Trade Law created an electronic commerce (UNCITRAL)
model law to describe which aspects of electronic commerce
should be enforced by legislative measures [9]. This model law
has influenced the creation of legislation in over 25 countries,
Including the United States of America, England, France,
South Africa ,China and many more. While these laws give
credence to the validity of electronic transactions, the laws do
not necessarily include concepts of a consumers or client’s
right to data privacy. The problem of ensuring data privacy
protection can be achieved in two different ways. Firstly, there
are legislative measures which enshrine a user’s right into law,
and secondly, there a self-regulatory standards that apply to
specific sectors. In particular, America has decided to regulate
certain sectors in terms of personal privacy protection. The
most recognised American regulations concerning protection
of personally identifiable information collected electronically
are:
• The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996 (HIPAA)
• The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998
(COPPA)
• Financial Modernization Act of 1999, also known as the
”Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act”
All the laws above provide specific laws defining how
companies should treat personal information. These laws have
caused as much turmoil to the operations of online websites
as they have provided benefits. As an example, The number of
complaints to hotmail, a web-based email service increased by
1,150% in April and May 2000 after it implemented safeguards
listed in COPPA [8]. This example shows that legislation
cannot provide a panacea for all privacy concerns, and in
fact, under the COPPA act, in some cases the customer had
to reveal more information about themselves to prove their
age. However, legislation is crucial to the wider adoption
of electronic commerce. Until a customer can be given the
guarantees that other forms of commerce can, it will never
grow into the market it is envisaged to be. A customer must
be confident that it can use its countries legal system to resolve
disputes.
The European council and member states recognise this fact
and the members states are proceeding to roll out legislation
derived from the UNCITRAL model law and the European
Council’s directives on privacy and electronic communications
[10]. The directive, known as Directive 2002/58/EC of the
European Parliament and Council of 12 July 2002 defines
personal information, who holds the rights to personal in-
formation and what rights are given to the person who the
personal information identifies. This Directive was created for
the electronic communications sector and extends the more
general Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data
and on the free movement of such data [11]. The details of
the legislative initiatives are beyond the scope of this paper
and are merely illustrating the negotiations necessary before
legally binding electronic transactions can take place which
will ensure that the users personal information used collected,
stored and disseminated according to the law or the wishes of
the client.
Legislative laws, such as South Africa’s Electronic Com-
munications and Transaction ACT 25 of 2002 [12] define
several roles that service providers must fulfill and sets out
the requirements of electronically binding contracts, rules for
companies selling goods or providing services online and
defines what information is considered personally identifiable
information (PII) and specifies how companies should handle
such information. Legislation like the ECT act gives con-
sumers more right to contest business transaction and unlawful
use of their PII. The ECT act of 2002 is derived from the
UNCITRAL Model law for electronic commerce. It therefore
stands to reason, that Web services based in South Africa
should be able to negotiate appropriate terms under which
to exchange personal information with other countries that
provide similar laws.
Web services must work within these laws and provide users
with the confidence that the entire Web services transaction
can be logged so that an authoritative body can determine
who was involved in a business transaction and what role they
played in that particular transaction. The following section
introduces the need for a framework in which such an auditing
trail can be created.
III. TRANSACTION PATH ELICITATION
This is the first step in creating a policy for a Web service
transactions incorporating multiple services. For every Web
Services transaction, there must be a finite number of services
involved in a certain Web Service transaction. Finding a chain
of services involved in a transaction can be done by requesting
a list of services from a service provider that that service
provider needs to contact in order to complete the transaction.
Given the list, each service on the list can then be called to
find out which services they will need to use to complete their
service. Using this technique, a Web service transaction chain
can be mapped recursively. Multiple routes and choices could
also be returned by service providers if there are more than
one service that can be used to complete a particular part of a
service. An example might be a list of certificate authorities.
The client will then be able to chose the best transaction path
for the transaction based on its own risk assessment of the
transaction chains.
Standards groups and Industry partners have created spec-
ifications which can be used to elicit the parties involved in
the transaction path. In table 1 a brief list is given.
These specifications all involve coordinating various busi-
ness processes at different levels. WS-Context[13] provides
TABLE I
LIST OF SPECIFICATIONS DEALING WITH TRANSACTIONS
Specification Standards Body
WS-Context OASIS
WS-Coordination IBM, BEA Systems, Microsoft, Arjuna, Hitachi, IONA
WS-AtomicTransaction WIBM, BEA Systems, Microsoft, Arjuna, Hitachi, IONA
WS-BusinessActivity IBM, BEA Systems, Microsoft, Arjuna, Hitachi, IONA
WS-Choreography W3C
mechanisms for managing information such as security tokens
and identifiers that is used in transactions involving multiple
parties.
WS-Choreography[14] provides an information model that
describes the sequence in which data tokens are passed be-
tween two or more participants to achieve a business goal.
WS-Choreography also defines the relationship between the
data tokens which are passed between parties involved in the
transaction.
WS-Coordination[15] is a specification for providing pro-
tocols that coordinate transactions across multiple parties. It
allows a context to be created in which a transaction can
be run and is meant to be extended by other specifica-
tions to deliver more concrete transaction coordination. WS-
AtomicTransaction and WS-BusinessActivity are both exten-
sions of WS-Coordination and provides rules for business
transactions that conform to ACID properties and longer
running asynchronous business transactions respectively.
It can be seen from the various groups working on these
specifications that there is a lot of interest in composite Web
services. However, all these specifications still need a way
to determine the trustworthiness of the services that they
engage in. These specifications all deal with the functional
requirements of the services involved in the transaction. In
[16], Van Rooyen and Hutchison outlined a trust assurance
protocol and trust determination technique that allows trust
and policy requirements to provide the necessary framework
so that disparate Web services can engage in complex business
transactions with confidence.
Eliciting the entire transaction path and negotiating the
privacy policies between all the parties involved in the trans-
action can range from trivial assertions made to each service
provider, or can involve a multiple party negotiation process.
However, regardless of how the details of the transaction
policy is formed, the initial steps of the framework remain
the same. The following sections provide more detail on how
a transaction policy can be formed. First the transaction path
must be found, the services rated and policies negotiated.
The protection of personal information in distributed trans-
actions involving more than one service provider, coupled with
information about each service providers’ trustworthiness will
create a more secure environment which will spur the creation
of services and open up new business revenue streams. It is
against this background that the author’s a creating a trust
assurance protocol, to determine the dyadic trust that can be
determined between the client and a service provider. The
measure of trust can be chained together to measure the trust
involved in the entire transaction chain. The protocol is an
extension of the WS-Policy and WS-Trust specifications and
combines contract law with internet commerce legislation, tak-
ing into account conflict resolution arbitration and jurisdiction.
IV. CONCLUSION
Electronic communications and transactions require more
safeguards and legal restrictions than conventional transac-
tions. With signed electronic documents now being accepted
as legally binding documents in more and more countries,
precautions are needed to ensure that commercial transactions
cannot easily be compromised or falsified. It is vital to ensure
that any transaction can be audited and held up to the scrutiny
of courts of law. Anonymity services cannot have a place in
legally binding transactions, unless the true information can
be recovered and revealed if the need arises and they use of
anonymising systems do not contravene any legislation that
requires a data controller to keep the information on record. It
is not the fact that PII has been transferred that electronic
transactions requires anonymity services, but rather that a
person or company has a legal recourse if his PII is abused.
Composite Web services require both legislature and con-
tractual agreement between the parties involved to allow
heterogenous services to interact in a safe and secure manner.
This paper highlighted the security concerns in transactions
that span multiple parties and acts as a motivation for more
advanced trust assurance protocols.
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